The great QE-driven paper chase is on in earnest now. With the average yield on so-called junk bonds now under 5% on Barclays US High Yield Index, risk pricing seems totally out of kilter.
Indeed, Apple just closed a $17billion book build (with $50 billion of demand) at a microscopic yields:
The real winners here are institutionalised borrowers, the junk bond names now able to borrow at under 5%. Main Street businesses, starved of oxygen, aren't so lucky as Federal Reserve liquidity is restricted to the narrow confines of Wall Street banks and their clients.
Moody's has released a note warning of misspricing in the high yield space:
Indeed, Apple just closed a $17billion book build (with $50 billion of demand) at a microscopic yields:
Apple’s debt sale included $4 billion of 1 percent, 5-year notes that pay 40 basis points, or 0.4 percentage point, more than similar-maturity Treasuries (USGG10YR); $5.5 billion of 2.4 percent, 10-year securities with a relative yield of 75 basis points and $3 billion of 3.85 percent, 30-year bonds paying an extra 100 points, data compiled by Bloomberg show.With the rally in defensive equity names in the US and Australian banks being consistently described as run for yield rather than reflective of valuations, the parade of unintended consequences of QE is swelling in numbers.
The real winners here are institutionalised borrowers, the junk bond names now able to borrow at under 5%. Main Street businesses, starved of oxygen, aren't so lucky as Federal Reserve liquidity is restricted to the narrow confines of Wall Street banks and their clients.
Moody's has released a note warning of misspricing in the high yield space:
The lackluster state of the world economy has curbed the growth of business sales. The US high yield bond spread has shown a strong inverse correlation with the JPMorgan/Markit global composite PMI index of world economic activity. Ordinarily, the high yield bond spread widens as the global composite PMI falls.
Nevertheless, despite how April 2013’s global composite PMI of 51.9 is well under its long-term median of 54.6, May 7’s high yield bond spread of 411 bp was well under its comparably measured median of 583 bp. Moreover, the statistical record suggests that the high yield spread ought to be closer to 700 bp, as opposed to approaching 400 bp. In fact, when the high yield spread last narrowed to 411 bp in December 2003, the global composite PMI approximated 60.0.Now perhaps this was the intention of central banks all along - to force investors to readjust their risk profiles. And the talk of potential negative rates in Europe following Mario Draghi's comments last week seems like more of the same stick even though the carrot is looking rather withered and blotchy. However, as Barnejek explains, central banks have had very little success in what happens to liquidity after they create it.
I don’t question the fact that such a move will persuade banks to search for higher-yielding assets, ie loans but what I’m trying to explain is that the liquidity in the banking system is like a hot potato. The central bank controls how much money there is in the system (using various ways, eg printing money, changing the reserve requirement etc) and the market only needs to decide the price of this money. The only way that lowering rates to the negative territory impacts the amount of cash in the system is because the central bank will be returning 99% of the money placed in it back to banks. But then which of the major central banks could even contemplate shrinking its balance sheet at the time when the global economy remains exceptionally fragile?
What I think discussions like the ones taking place in Europe will lead to is significant re-pricing of interbank rates (BOR-OIS spreads could decline massively as banks start passing on the potato) and an increased demand for government or quasi-government bonds by banks’ assets and liabilities management desks (ALMs). Perhaps this is the point of the whole exercise. Then again, isn’t it yet another version of crowding out and actually forcing banks to play the carry in government bond markets? Hard to see how that should please politicians but perhaps this is the only path to rejuvenate the credit action. I really don’t like growth implications of such a process. Unless of course the ultimate beneficiaries, ie the governments, use the extra demand for their papers to increase public spending… But I will spare you, Dear Reader, yet another discussion about consequences of austerity. There’s this chap in the US who does that several times a day.Fear of missing out now has a new acronym companion in the investment world: FOBOR - Forced Buyers of Risk.
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